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## 2. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MISSILE ANNOUNCEMENT

### Comment on:



The Soviet announcement on 26 August of a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and a series of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions

"in recent days" is probably intended to help set the stage for a major Soviet offensive at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly for a suspension of nuclear weapons tests and a pledge not to use nuclear weapons or missiles carrying nuclear warheads. The USSR probably anticipates an early recess in the London disarmament talks and believes that the General Assembly will provide a more effective forum to seek support for its position from many small non-nuclear powers.

The TASS announcement of the test included the standard charge that the Western powers were creating obstacles to a disarmament agreement, particularly a cessation of tests. The Soviet proposals of 30 April and 7 June for a partial disarmament agreement called for renunciation of the use for military purposes of both nuclear weapons and missiles of any range carrying nuclear warheads. Soviet spokesmen in the past have played down the problem of inspection and control of missile experiments, stressing that the danger comes from the nuclear warheads.

In addition, Moscow probably calculates that its announcement will add substance to the Soviet warnings last spring that NATO members and other countries which permitted American guided missile bases on their territories would be subjected to Soviet nuclear devastation in the event of war. (SECRET)

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### 3. FURTHER ACTION AGAINST MALENKOV INDICATED

#### Comment on:



A new attack on former Soviet Premier Georgy Malenkov by Party Secretary Khrushchev in heretofore unpublicized speeches appears intended to prepare the way for further punitive action against

Malenkov. Summaries of these speeches were reprinted in the party journal Kommunist and partially broadcast by Radio Moscow on 27 August. Characterizing him as Beria's "shadow," Khrushchev accused Malenkov of "taking advantage of Stalin's weaknesses in the last years of his life. In many instances he incited him to take action which was deserving of stern condemnation."

Khrushchev seems to be preparing a case in which Malenkov will be accused of masterminding some of the worst excesses of the latter part of the Stalin era. Malenkov, the leading rival of Khrushchev among those indicted at the June plenum of the central committee, is the logical victim of the main attack. He was also singled out as the most heinous member of the "anti-party group" in the propaganda barrage following the June plenum, being the one member of the opposition, for instance, charged with complicity in the notorious "Leningrad affair."

The return to the offensive against Malenkov after a period of relative quiet may stem from the need to silence any continuing opposition to Khrushchev's policies and to try to create a new wave of popular indignation against Malenkov that apparently was not achieved during the initial effort.

As further information on the speeches carried in Kommunist becomes available, the status of the remaining members of the "anti-party group" may be clarified. Molotov and Kaganovich have reportedly been further criticized in secret letters from the central committee to party organizations throughout the country, but they have not been accused of misdeeds as severe as those of Malenkov. The diverse treatment thus far accorded Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov suggests that each case is being considered separately and that the fate of these other leading opponents is not necessarily wrapped up with that of Malenkov. (SECRET)

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7. **INDONESIAN ARMY IN JAVA REPORTEDLY VOTED  
FOR COMMUNISTS**

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[REDACTED] Over 60 percent of the votes cast by the Indonesian army and police in Java during recent local elections were for the Communist party, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The armed forces and police vote can be ascertained because they voted separately from the general public. Reportedly very few police voted. (NOFORN)

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**Comment**

Even if exaggerated, this report is indicative of gains made by the Communists in penetrating army units in Java. Enlisted men and noncommissioned officers, like the general population, undoubtedly were influenced by the Communist party's campaign tactic of identifying itself with President Sukarno and his concept of "guided democracy."

The officer corps in Java, however, is still believed to be largely anti-Communist.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

8. ARREST OF KEY OPPOSITION LEADER MAY PROVOKE  
SERIOUS UNREST IN VENEZUELA

Comment on:

The arrest of Rafael Caldera, chief Venezuelan opposition leader and head of the Catholic-oriented COPEI party, has provoked widespread concern in Venezuela and may seriously compound

President Perez' problems in seeking another five-year term in the December elections. The church, which has been at odds with the government since last May and in August openly protested against the regime's authoritarian political policies, is apparently determined to insist on Caldera's release. The church and the principal opposition factions would probably support Caldera's presidential candidacy in the event he is allowed to run.

The American embassy in Caracas comments that Caldera's arrest is a serious official blunder since his "martyrdom" might lead to a surge of popular support or even demonstrations in his behalf. The arrest further indicates the government's lack of confidence in Perez' popular support for re-election.

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## 9. GOMULKA REPORTEDLY TO VISIT TITO

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Polish Party First Secretary Gomulka plans to visit Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia in September or early October,

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### Comment

The possibility of a Tito-Gomulka meeting was suggested by reports that Tito's chief of protocol visited Warsaw last month. Shortly after Gomulka's rise to power in October 1956, the Yugoslavs expressed their willingness to consult with the Poles at any time at the highest level, but indicated their understanding that the Polish political situation might well make such a move impossible at that time.

Gomulka may feel that the Tito-Khrushchev talks earlier this month, as well as Moscow's favorable comment on Ho Chi Minh's visit to Yugoslavia, preclude any Soviet objection to a meeting with Tito. An atmosphere more favorable to Polish-Yugoslav talks has resulted from the rebuff administered to Soviet "dogmatists" at the Soviet party plenum in June and the subsequent lessening of domestic opposition from Stalinist elements in the Polish party. The Poles are studying some economic aspects of the Yugoslav system to determine their applicability in Poland.

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